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Abstract: A number of products that display positive network eﬀects are used in variable quantities
by heterogeneous customers. Examples include corporate operating systems, infrastructure software, web
services and networking equipment. In many of these contexts, the magnitude of network eﬀects are influ-
enced by gross consumption, rather than simply by user base. Moreover, the value an individual customer
derives on account of these network eﬀects may be related to the extent of their individual consumption,
and therefore, the network eﬀects may be heterogeneous across customers.
This paper presents a model of nonlinear pricing in the presence of such network eﬀects, under incomplete
information, and with the threat of competitive entry. Both homogeneous and heterogeneous network eﬀects
are modeled. Conditions under which a fulfilled-expectations contract exists and is unique are established.
While network eﬀects generally raise prices, it is shown that accompanying changes in consumption depend
on the nature of the network eﬀects — in some cases, it is optimal for the monopolist to induce no changes
in usage across customers, while in others cases, network eﬀects raise the usage of all market participants.
Optimal pricing is shown to include quantity discounts that increase with usage, and may also involve a
nonlinear two-part tariﬀ. These results highlight the impact of network eﬀects on the standard trade-oﬀ
between price discrimination and value creation, and have important implications for pricing policy.
The threat of entry generally lowers profits for the monopolist, and increases customer surplus. When
network eﬀects are homogeneous across customers, the resulting entry-deterring monopoly contract is a fixed
fee and results in the socially optimal outcome. However, when the magnitude of heterogeneous network
eﬀects is relatively high, there are no changes in total surplus induced by the entry threat, and the price
changes merely cause a transfer of value from the seller to its customers. The presence of network eﬀects,
and of a credible entry threat, are also shown to increase distributional eﬃciency by reducing the disparity
in relative value captured by diﬀerent customer types. Regulatory and policy implications of these results
are discussed.
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1. Introduction
This paper presents a model in which products displays positive network eﬀects, individual con-
sumption varies across heterogeneous customers, and the magnitude of network eﬀects depend on
gross consumption. The principal goals of the paper are to characterize the optimal nonlinear pric-
ing schedules for diﬀerent kinds of network eﬀects, and under the potential threat of competitive
entry, and to study their consumption and welfare properties.
Standard theories of network eﬀects typically assume that each customer purchases a maximum
of one unit of the product, that the value of the network eﬀect is proportionate to the total size
of the product’s eventual user base, and that all customer benefit equally from the network eﬀects
(Katz and Shapiro, 1985, Farrell and Saloner, 1985). However, there are a number of products
that display network eﬀects (henceforth termed network goods) which are consumed in variable
quantities by diﬀerent customers, and for which the magnitude of the network eﬀects may depend
on the total quantity consumed across customers, rather than simply the total number of adopters.
In addition, the value each customer derives from the network good may depend on their individual
consumption, which in turn depends on the intrinsic value they place on the product. Extending the
standard theory to incorporate these observations may have important implications for companies
seeking to design optimal pricing policy for their network goods, as well as for the regulatory
analysis of industries with network eﬀects.
The relevance of these observations can be illustrated through a few common examples of
products that display network eﬀects. Consider, for instance, the purchase of PC operating systems
software by corporate customers. The (simplest) pricing problem faced by a seller in this market is
one of choosing a pricing schedule, where quantity is measured by number of user licenses, and each
corporate customer purchases a variable quantity of licenses. The network eﬀects are caused largely
by the higher availability and quality of complementary goods (applications software, compatible
accessories) as the total number of OS installations increases. Consequently, the magnitude of
the network eﬀects are proportionate to the total number of licenses sold (the gross consumption),
rather than simply the number of corporations who adopt the OS. Moreover, a corporation which
has a higher number of licenses benefits more from the increased quality and availability of the
complementary goods — in other words, the value realized from the network eﬀects also depends on
individual consumption, and may therefore be heterogeneous across corporations2.
A similar argument can be made for back-end or enterprise software used in variable quantities
by diﬀerent companies (Oracle’s database software and Siebel’s CRM software being two examples),
2In addition, there is a positive externality driven by value from interoperability, which is far more important
within an organization than across companies, and is therefore influenced more by individual consumption.
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or for networking equipment like routers and switches. In these cases, network eﬀects are driven
by the ease with which one can find qualified support or administration engineers, trained employ-
ees, compatible software, or compatible equipment3. Network goods sold directly to individuals
consumers may also display the same properties. For example, electronic marketplaces like eBay
are widely recognized as displaying positive network eﬀects, which stem from increased liquidity, as
well as a wider availability of robust systems supporting marketplace services (reputation, escrow,
payment, settlement, dispute resolution). The magnitude of the network eﬀects increases not just
with the number of participants in the market, but with the extent to which each participant ac-
tually buys and sells; moreover, an individual who participates more realizes higher benefits from
them. Even for products used as canonical examples of network goods, such as telephone service,
usage varies across consumers, network eﬀects dependent on total consumption as well as installed
base, users with higher consumption levels benefit more from the network eﬀects, and pricing is
often nonlinear.
The ubiquity of variable consumption and heterogenous value from network goods underlines the
importance of developing a model that incorporates these properties. This paper provides such an
model, characterizing the optimal nonlinear pricing schedule for a monopolist selling a network good
which explicitly displays the properties highlighted in the examples above. Two cases are analyzed
successively. First, network eﬀects whose magnitude depends on gross realized consumption (and
are homogeneous across customers) are studied. Subsequently, network eﬀects whose magnitude is
heterogeneous across customers (by virtue of depending on both gross consumption and individual
consumption) are modeled. The changes in consumption induced by the network eﬀects are shown
to vary significantly across the cases. There are also interesting variations in the manner in which
the value generated by the network eﬀects is distributed across the diﬀerent customers. Moreover,
while there are progressively steeper quantity discounts as individual consumption increases in both
cases, optimal pricing in the latter case may involve a two-part tariﬀ.
In addition to pure monopoly pricing, this paper also analyzes pricing by an entry-deterring
monopolist. Many markets for technology goods feature dominant sellers with market power, and
there has been substantial recent interest in whether (and how) the potential threat of entry aﬀects
their pricing choices. For instance, in the recent U.S. versus Microsoft case, both parties agreed
that Microsoft’s pricing was not consistent with monopoly profit maximization, and Schmalensee
(1999) argued that Microsoft underprices in order to reduce the desirability of entry by competing
firms into the market for operating systems. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) develop a formal model
3While open networking standards do form the basis for most networking equipment, many vendors like Cisco
Systems use proprietary operating systems. Moreover, the ease of interoperability between equipment from competing
vendors varies widely.
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of limit pricing that supports this argument, in which installed base plays an entry-deterring role
analogous to that of excess capacity (Spence, 1977, Dixit, 1980).
This paper proposes and analyzes an alternate representation, in which to successfully deter
a threat of entry, the monopolist must provide each customer with surplus equal to at least the
maximum intrinsic value they could get from a competing product. This limits the price each
customer pays under the monopolist’s nonlinear pricing schedule to being no more than the network
value they get from the monopolist’s product. As a consequence, network value may play the role
of being the primary source of profits for a monopolist who prices to successfully deter entry. On
the face of it, this has promising welfare implications, since one would expect a threat of entry to
induce a substantial increase in consumption. Surprisingly, it is shown that there are sometimes
no consumption changes (despite price reductions), and that when there are, the consumption
increases are confined largely to a lower subset of types. However, entry deterrence is shown to
even out the relative distribution of surplus across diﬀerent customer types.
This paper draws from and adds to two lines of research. The first is the literature on monopoly
pricing of technology products with positive network externalities. Related papers with monopoly
models include Rohlfs (1974), Oren, Smith and Wilson (1982), Economides (1996a), and Cabral,
Salant and Woroch (1999). Modeling network goods for which the network eﬀects depend on gross
consumption (rather than the number of adopters) is new, as is the analysis of heterogeneity in the
value of the network eﬀects across customers. The concept of fulfilled-expectations equilibrium is
extended to the case of customers purchasing variable quantities in a monopoly market. A related
area of research is the literature on monopoly with negative consumption externalities, specifically in
the context of congestion in queuing and service systems (Mendelson, 1985, Dewan and Mendelson,
1990, Mendelson and Whang, 1990, Westland, 1992).
The second line of research this paper adds to is the literature on single-dimensional price
screening. It contributes new results to the theory by characterizing how positive network eﬀects of
diﬀerent kinds aﬀect optimal nonlinear pricing, and by establishing conditions under which optimal
nonlinear pricing schedules that satisfy fulfilled-expectations exist and are unique. It complements
recent work by Segal and Whinston (2001), and by Jullien (2001), that examine diﬀerent problems
of optimal contracting in the presence of network externalities.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 specifies the basic model, defines the
solution concept, and characterizes the model’s description of entry deterrence. Section 3 presents
the analysis of the monopoly with homogeneous network eﬀects, and Section 4 analyzes the case
of heterogeneous network eﬀects. Both sections 3 and 4 examine pricing and consumption changes
induced by network eﬀects, examine some welfare properties, establish how nonlinear pricing is
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aﬀected by the threat of entry, and conclude with a simple example that illustrates the nature
of the optimal pricing schedule and surplus distribution. Section 5 discusses the results further,
discusses the model’s assumptions, and concludes with an outline of open research questions raised.
2. Model
2.1. Firm and customers
A monopolist sells a homogeneous product which may be used by consumers in varying quantities.
The variable costs of production are assumed to be zero (though Section 5.2 describes how the
model’s results are robust to relaxing this assumption). Customers are heterogeneous, indexed by
their type θ ∈ [θ, θ]. The monopolist does not observe the type of any customer, but knows F (θ),
the probability distribution of types in the customer population. F (θ) is assumed to be strictly
increasing and absolutely continuous, and therefore the corresponding density function f(θ) exists
and is strictly positive for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. In addition, 1−F (θ)f(θ) , the reciprocal of the hazard rate, is
assumed to be non-increasing for all θ. Each customer knows their own type θ. The total number
of customers in the market is normalized to 1.
The preferences of a customer of type θ are represented by the linearly separable utility function
V (q, θ,Q, p) =W (q, θ, Q)− p, (2.1)
where q is the quantity of the product used by the customer (often referred to as individual con-
sumption), Q is the total quantity of the product used by all customers in the market (often referred
to as the gross consumption) and p is the total price paid by the customer. W (q, θ, Q) is often
referred to as the value function.
The value function when Q = 0 is denoted U(q, θ), and is referred to as the intrinsic value from
the network good for customer type θ. That is:
U(q, θ) =W (q, θ, 0) (2.2)
for all q, θ. At any positive Q, the expression [W (q, θ, Q) − U(q, θ)] is referred to as the network
value from the network good for customer type θ.
The value function W (q, θ, Q) is assumed to have the following properties:
1. W11(q, θ,Q) < 0, W2(q, θ,Q) > 0, W12(q, θ,Q) > 0.
2. W3(q, θ, Q) ≥ 0, W13(q, θ,Q) ≥ 0, W23(q, θ,Q) ≥ 0
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3.
d
dθ
(
−W11(q, θ, Q)
W1(q, θ, Q)
) < 0, W122(q, θ,Q) ≤ 0.
4. β(θ,Q) = argmax
q
W (q, θ, Q) is finite and unique for all θ. W1(q, θ,Q) > 0 for q < β(θ, Q),
and W1(q, θ, Q) < 0 for q > β(θ,Q).
Numbered subscripts to functions denote partial derivatives with respect to the corresponding
variable. The first set of properties — strict concavity in q, increasing value with type, and increasing
marginal value with type (the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition) — are common assumptions
in models of nonlinear pricing. The second set of properties characterizes the nature of the network
eﬀects — the gross value from the network eﬀects is non-decreasing in gross consumption, and
the marginal value from an increase in gross consumption is (weakly) higher at a higher level of
individual consumption, and is (weakly) higher for higher types. The source of these network eﬀects
are not modeled explicitly. The model therefore adopts what Economides (1996b) calls the ‘macro’
approach.
The third set of properties assume decreasing absolute risk aversion (which is frequently used to
characterize the relative curvature of the value functions of diﬀerent customer types), and marginal
utility that is concave in type θ (which is a standard assumption to ensures that the optimal
contract separates customer types). In one case, a slightly stronger assumption than decreasing
absolute risk aversion — that the concavity of W with respect to q does not increase with type — is
necessary4.
The final set of properties simply state that there is a consumption level beyond which the
value from additional consumption decreases. It reflects the reality that customers consume a
finite quantity of any network good, even if the marginal price of additional consumption is zero
(under a site license, for instance). This is because value from usage is typically bounded by a
constraint on some related resource — attention or computing power being two common examples —
and the implicit presence of a substitute use for this resource. Analogously, sometimes the increased
consumption of the product may necessitate the purchase of additional necessary complementary
assets (more powerful computer hardware for increased software usage, for instance)5. The quantity
that maximizes intrinsic value is denoted α(θ) — that is, α(θ) = β(θ, 0).
Each customer of type θ is assumed to have reservation utility Uˆ(θ) ≥ 0. The functions F (θ),
W (q, θ, Q), U(q, θ), and Uˆ(θ) are common knowledge. Notation used most frequently (some of
which is defined formally later in the paper) is summarized in Table 2.1.
4If W1(q, θ, Q) > 0, then W112(q, θ, Q) ≥ 0 implies that ddθ (
−W11(q,θ,Q)
W1(q,θ,Q) ) < 0.
5See Sundararajan (2002), Section 4, for more discussion and examples. Also Section 5.2 of the current paper
discusses relaxing this assumption in the presence of convex costs.
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Symbol Explanation
θ Index of customer types. θ ∈ [θ, θ]
f(θ), F (θ) Density and distribution functions of the customer types θ.
W (q, θ,Q) Value that customer type θ gets from individual consumption q and gross
consumption Q.
U(q, θ) Intrinsic value that customer type θ gets from individual consumption
q. By definition, U(q, θ) =W (q, θ, 0).
β(θ,Q) Individual consumption that maximizes W (q, θ,Q).
α(θ) Individual consumption at which intrinsic value for type θ is maximized.
By definition, α(θ) = β(θ, 0).
q(t), τ(t) Generic representation of a pricing schedule (or a contract) as a con-
tinuum of quantity-price pairs, indexed by t. Under this contract, a
customer who buys a quantity q(t) is charged a price τ(t).
qF (θ, Q), τF (θ, Q) Q-feasible contract. These contracts satisfy incentive compatibility and
individual rationality for all θ, at an expected level of gross consumption
Q.
q(θ,Q), τ(θ, Q) Q-optimal contract, which is the profit-maximizing Q-feasible contract.
q∗(θ), τ∗(θ) Optimal fulfilled-expectations contract.
Q∗ Gross consumption under the optimal fulfilled-expectations contract.
Q∗ =
R
q∗(θ)f(θ)dθ.
s∗(θ) Surplus of customers of type θ under the optimal fulfilled-expectations
contract. s∗(θ) =W (q∗(θ), θ, Q∗)− τ∗(θ).
sF (θ) Relative surplus of customers of type θ under the optimal fulfilled-
expectations contract. sF (θ) =
s∗(θ)R
s∗(θ)f(θ)dθ
.
Table 2.1: Summary of key notation
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The monopolist chooses a pricing schedule (also called a contract) which specifies a price for
each level of individual consumption q. Since the monopolist cannot explicitly distinguish between
customer types prior to contracting, the entire menu of quantity-price pairs must be available to all
customers. Rather than explicitly considering all possible pricing functions, the revelation principle
ensures that we can restrict our analysis to direct mechanisms which specify the pricing schedule as
a menu of quantity-price pairs (q(t), τ(t)), where where t ∈ [θ, θ], which are incentive-compatible.
2.2. Sequence of events
The interaction between the monopolist and their customers is according to the following sequence:
1. The monopolist announces their pricing schedule as a menu of quantity-price pairs q(t), τ(t).
2. Customers observe q(t), τ(t), and form an expectation about what the gross consumption un-
der this pricing schedule will be. All customers have access to the same relevant information6,
and are assumed to form the same expectation QE, which is also known to the monopolist.
3. Based on their type θ and the expectation of gross consumptionQE , each customer determines
their optimal individual consumption q(t(θ)), where t(θ) = argmax
t
[W (q(t), θ, QE)− τ(t)]. If
the customer gets at least their reservation utility, that is, if:
W (q(t(θ)), θ,QE)− τ(t(θ)) ≥ Uˆ(θ), (2.3)
then the customer chooses to consume q(t(θ)) and pay τ(t(θ)). If not, the customer does not
participate, and purchases zero quantity.
4. The monopolist gets a payoﬀ of Z
θ∈Θ
τ(t(θ))f(θ)dθ, (2.4)
where Θ is the set of participating types. Each participating customer gets a payoﬀ of
W (q(t(θ)), θ,QA)− τ(t(θ)), (2.5)
where QA is the actual realized gross consumption. Each customer that does not participate
gets a payoﬀ of Uˆ(θ).
6The customer’s unique knowledge of their own type does not aﬀect their expectation of gross consumption, which
is completely determined by f(θ), the pricing schedule, and the functions U(q, θ), W (q, θ, Q), and Uˆ(θ) (all of which
are common knowledge at this stage).
7
2.3. Contracts
This subsection defines the diﬀerent contracts that are used in subsequent analysis. To simplify
notation, the definition of the following contracts is based on the assumption of full participation
— that is, that all customers find it optimal to purchase under the contract, if it specifies a non-
negative allocation for their type. In sections 3 and 4, inducing full participation is always optimal
for the monopolist.
Q-feasible contracts: Given any expectation of gross consumption Q, a Q-feasible contract
is a menu of of quantity-price pairs (qF (t,Q), τF (t,Q)) which satisfies incentive-compatibility [IC]
and individual rationality [IR] :
[IC] : θ = argmax
t
W (qF (t,Q), θ, Q)− τF (t,Q) ∀θ (2.6)
[IR] : W (qF (θ,Q), θ,Q)− τF (θ,Q) ≥ Uˆ(θ) ∀θ (2.7)
Q-optimal contracts: Given any expectation of gross consumption Q, an Q-optimal contract
(q(θ,Q), τ(θ, Q)) is a Q-feasible contract that solves the monopolist’s profit maximization problem:
max
qF (t,Q),τF (t,Q)
θZ
θ
τF (t, Q)f(t)dt, (2.8)
over all (qF (t,Q), τF (t,Q)) that satisfy [IC] and [IR].
Optimal fulfilled-expectations contracts: A optimal fulfilled-expectations contract is a
menu of price-quantity pairs q∗(θ), τ∗(θ) such that the contract q(θ, Q), τ(θ,Q) defined by
Q =
θZ
θ
q∗(θ)f(θ)dθ
q(θ, Q) = q∗(θ) (2.9)
τ(θ, Q) = τ ∗(θ)
is a Q-optimal contract.
Based on the definitions above, note that if any Q-optimal contract q(θ,Q), τ(θ, Q) satisfies
fulfilled-expectations [FE] for some Q:
[FE] : Q =
θZ
θ
q(θ,Q)f(θ)dθ, (2.10)
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then the contract q∗(θ) = q(θ,Q), τ∗(θ) = τ(θ,Q) is an optimal fulfilled-expectations contract.
The solution that the monopolist seeks is a optimal fulfilled-expectations contract. The con-
ditions for the existence and possible uniqueness of these contracts are described independently in
each subsection.
2.4. Entry deterrence and participation constraints
The monopolist in the model may face a threat of entry from an entrant7, whose product is
intrinsically a perfect substitute for the monopolist’s product. By virtue of being the incumbent,
the monopolist’s product generates positive network value for all customers. The entrant’s product,
on the other hand, is assumed to provide only its intrinsic value to the customers. The fixed cost
of entry is assumed to be zero.
The purpose of this subsection is to establish that the problem of pricing to deter entry under
the threat of costless entry is equivalent to a problem of pricing in the absence of the entry threat,
but instead with specific type-dependent individual rationality constraints.
At a gross consumption level Q, the utility of a customer of type θ who purchases a quantity
q of the monopolist’s product for a payment p is (W (q, θ, Q)− p), and the utility of a customer of
type θ who purchases a quantity q of the entrant’s product for a payment p is (U(q, θ)− p). Given
a set of prices, and an expectation Q of gross consumption of the monopolist’s product, customers
choose the product and quantity that maximizes their utility. Customers indiﬀerent between the
monopolist’s and the entrant’s products are assumed to choose the monopolist’s product.
A complete characterization of the entry game is not provided. Rather, the analysis focuses
on the characteristics of pricing schedules for the monopolist that successfully deter entry. Since
the fixed cost of entry is assumed to be zero, these are pricing schedules for the monopolist under
which any pricing schedule oﬀered by the entrant results in zero profits for the entrant.
Recall that
α(θ) = argmax
q
U(q, θ), (2.11)
and that
β(θ, Q) = argmax
q
W (q, θ,Q). (2.12)
Suppose the entrant oﬀered the constant pricing scheme p(q) = ε, where ε is small. Under this
pricing scheme, each customer would choose their intrinsic-value maximizing level of consumption
α(θ), and would realize surplus of (U(α(θ), θ)− ε). If customers of type θ expected surplus of less
7The analysis would not change if there were multiple identical entrants.
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than (U(α(θ), θ)−ε) from the monopolist’s product, they would buy the entrant’s product, and the
entrant would receive non-zero profits. Therefore, in order to deter entry, the monopolist’s pricing
scheme must provide customers of type θ with a surplus of at least (U(α(θ), θ)− ε), for all ε > 0.
Clearly, this cannot be achieved unless the monopolist’s pricing scheme provides customers of type
θ with surplus of at least U(α(θ), θ). Since U(α(θ), θ) is the maximum surplus that a customer of
type θ can get from the entrant’s product under any pricing scheme, ensuring that customers get
this level of surplus is both necessary and suﬃcient for the monopolist to deter entry.
As a consequence, when the fixed cost of entry is zero, deterring entry simply imposes a lower
bound on the surplus each customer type must receive. Analytically, this is identical to the problem
of choosing a pricing scheme with type-dependent individual rationality constraints (Jullien, 2000).
In other words, setting Uˆ(θ) = U(α(θ), θ) in equation (2.7) ensures that any Q-feasible contract
deters entry, and the definitions of all the other contracts in section 2.3 remain the same.
When faced with a threat of entry, the monopolist’s problem is therefore to choose the optimal
fulfilled-expectations contract, with Uˆ(θ) = U(α(θ), θ). In the following sections, the monopolist’s
problem is solved both in the absence of an entry threat, as well as in its presence, for both
homogeneous and heterogeneous network eﬀects.
2.5. Preliminary results
The purpose of this subsection is to present two preliminary results used in the subsequent analysis.
The first result characterizes the optimal contract oﬀered by the monopolist in the absence of
network eﬀects — that is, when W (q, θ,Q) = U(q, θ) for all Q. This is termed the base case, and is
used as a benchmark in sections 3 and 4. The second result describes the structure of Q-optimal
contracts, and demonstrates their uniqueness.
In the base case, since there are no network eﬀects, fulfilled-expectations do not play a role.
Lemma 1. When W (q, θ, Q) = U(q, θ), the monopolist oﬀers the contract q0(θ), τ 0(θ) which sat-
isfies the following conditions for all θ:
U1(q
0(θ), θ)
U12(q0(θ), θ)
=
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
; (2.13)
τ0(θ) = U(q0(θ), θ)−
θZ
θ
U2(q
0(x), x)dx (2.14)
This contract defined by (2.13) and (2.14) is unique. Moreover, for all θ such that q0(θ) > 0, it
satisfies q01(θ) > 0, τ
0
1(θ) > 0.
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The proof of this result is omitted. The reader is referred to chapter 2 of Salanie´ (1997) for a
simple exposition, or to Maskin and Riley (1984) for more details. A complete proof based on a
model formulation similar to that of this paper is also available in Sundararajan (2002).
Lemma 2. If Uˆ(θ) = 0, for every expectation of consumptionQ, theQ-optimal contract q(θ, Q), τ(θ,Q)
is unique, and is defined by the following conditions:
W1(q(θ, Q), θ, Q)
W12(q(θ,Q), θ,Q)
=
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
, (2.15)
and
τ(θ, Q) =W (q(θ, Q), θ, Q)−
θZ
θ
W2(q(θ, Q), x,Q)dx. (2.16)
Unless otherwise specified, proofs of all results are available in Appendix A.
3. Homogeneous network eﬀects
This section analyzes network eﬀects that depend on just gross consumption, and discusses some
properties of consumption, pricing and welfare under the optimal fulfilled-expectations contract.
The value function W (q, θ,Q) is assumed to be linearly separable in intrinsic value and network
value, and to take the following form
W (q, θ,Q) = U(q, θ) +w(Q). (3.1)
From the definition of intrinsic value U(q, θ), (3.1) implies that w(0) = 0.
3.1. Pure monopoly pricing
In the absence of an entry threat (which is referred to as pure monopoly, to distinguish it from
the subsequent entry-deterring monopoly), the following proposition establishes that the unique
solution to the monopolist’s problem is very similar to that of the base case:
Proposition 1. If W (q, θ,Q) = U(q, θ) + w(Q), then the optimal fulfilled-expectations contract
takes the form:
q∗(θ) = q0(θ); (3.2)
τ∗(θ) = τ0(θ) +w(Q0), (3.3)
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Figure 3.1: Illustrates the optimal consumption of two types θ1 and θ2 (θ1 < θ2) with homogeneous
network eﬀects under pure monopoly. First-order necessary conditions are met for each type at
the intersection of the U1(q, θ) and the U12(q, θ)
1−F (θ)
f(θ) curves. As a consequence, q
∗(θ) = q0(θ).
where q0(θ) and τ0(θ) are specified in (2.13) and (2.14), and Q0 =
θR
θ
q0(θ)f(θ)dθ. A contract of
this form exists and is unique for any function w(Q).
Proposition 1 shows that when the network value function depends on just gross consumption,
the monopolist finds it optimal to induce levels of consumption from each customer type that
are identical to those in the absence of network eﬀects, and to simply increase the total price
charged to every type by an amount equal to the network value. The intuition behind this result
is straightforward. For any common expectation Q of gross consumption, the value functions of all
customer types are shifted up by the same constant amount w(Q). Since there is no change in the
marginal properties of the utility functions, the monopolist’s optimal allocation q∗(θ) remains the
same for all types. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
It is evident from (3.3) that the monopolist captures all of the increase in surplus from the
network eﬀects. In addition, customer surplus does not change for any customer type relative to
the base case. This outcome changes substantially when there is an entry threat, as established in
the following subsection.
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3.2. Entry-deterring monopoly pricing
This subsection specifies the optimal fulfilled-expectations contracts in the presence of an entry
threat that is successfully deterred. The main result establishes that the unique solution to the
monopolist’s problem in this case is to specify a quantity-independent (fixed-fee) pricing schedule:
Proposition 2. If W (q, θ,Q) = U(q, θ) + w(Q), then the optimal fulfilled-expectations contract
that deters entry takes the form:
q∗(θ) = α(θ); (3.4)
τ∗(θ) = w(Q∗), (3.5)
where Q∗ =
θR
θ
α(θ)f(θ)dθ. A contract of this form exists and is unique for any network value
function w(Q).
Proposition 2 establishes that when network eﬀects depend on just gross consumption, the
optimal entry-deterring pricing scheme results in all customers choosing the level of consumption
that maximizes total surplus8. Intuitively, a contract that separates any subset of types (in order
to price-discriminate) would need to induce consumption levels that are strictly lower than α(θ)
for all but the highest type in this subset. This would result in a strict decrease in profits for
the monopolist, since they would have to share some portion of the network value w(Q∗) with
the customers in this subset in order to satisfy [IR] and ensure that customer surplus is at least
U(α(θ), θ). The accompanying reduction in Q∗ accentuates the reduction in monopoly profits
further. As a consequence, it is strictly profit-reducing to price-discriminate, and the monopolist
oﬀers the fixed-fee that maximizes profits.
3.3. Example
An example is analyzed to illustrate the results of Propositions 1 and 2 further, and to examine
how network eﬀects and the threat of entry changes the surplus distribution across customers.
In order to perform the latter analysis, define the customer surplus function as:
s∗(θ) =W (q∗(θ), θ,Q∗)− τ∗(θ). (3.6)
s∗(θ) is the surplus that customers of type θ get under the optimal fulfilled-expectations contract.
8Note that since W1(q, θ, Q) = 0 in this case, β(θ, Q) = α(θ).
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Base case
Optimal contract: q0(θ) = 2θ; τ0(θ) = 2θ − θ2
Pure monopoly
Q-optimal contract: q(θ,Q) = 2θ; τ(θ,Q) = 2θ − θ2 +wQ
Optimal fulfilled-expectations contract: q∗(θ) = 2θ; τ∗(θ) = 2θ − θ2 +w
Surplus functions: s∗(θ) = θ2; sF (θ) = 3θ
2
Entry-deterring monopoly
Q-optimal contract: q(θ,Q) = θ + 1; τ(θ,Q) = wQ
Optimal fulfilled-expectations contract: q∗(θ) = θ + 1; τ∗(θ) =
3w
2
Surplus functions: s∗(θ) =
(θ + 1)2
2
; sF (θ) =
3(θ + 1)2
7
Table 3.1: Optimal contracts and surplus expressions from the example with homogeneous network
eﬀects
Also, define the surplus distribution function sF (θ) as:
sF (θ) =
s∗(θ)R
s∗(θ)f(θ)dθ
. (3.7)
sF (θ) measures how is the total customer surplus (that is, the total value not captured by the
monopolist) is distributed across the diﬀerent customer types. It enables one to examine how
changes in network eﬀects aﬀect the relative levels of surplus that diﬀerent customer types get.
The example uses a simple quadratic value function, and uniformly distributed customer types.
The value function is assumed to take the following form:
W (q, θ, Q) = (θ + 1)q − 1
2
q2 +wQ, (3.8)
and customer types are assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, which implies that
f(θ) = 1 and F (θ) = θ.
The contracts and surplus values that result from applying Propositions 1 and 2, and equations
(3.6) and (3.7) are summarized in Table 3.1. Under pure monopoly, consistent with Proposition 1,
consumption is unaﬀected by the network eﬀects, and prices increase by an amount equal to the
network value. Under entry deterring monopoly, individual consumption increases for all customers,
and a fixed fee equal to the network value is charged to each customer.
Figure 3.2 (a) and (b) illustrate how q∗(θ) and τ∗(θ) vary with type. By substituting q∗(θ) into
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Figure 3.2: Illustrate the optimal fulfilled-expectation contracts and corresponding customer surplus
and relative surplus, in the example when network eﬀects are homogeneous across types.
τ∗(θ), one can derive the explicit pricing function p(q) = q− q
2
4 , which is strictly concave, which in
turn implies a progressively increasing quantity discount.
Under entry-deterring monopoly, prices increase for a subset of lower types. However, so does
customer surplus, as indicated in Figure 3.2 (c). Furthermore, Figure 3.2 (d) shows that when
there is a threat of entry, the relative distribution of surplus across diﬀerent customer types is
less skewed in favor of higher-usage customers. This is despite the increase in total price for the
lower-usage customers, relative to the higher-usage customers.
These results are discussed further in Section 5.
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4. Heterogeneous network eﬀects
This section models network eﬀects that depend on both gross consumption and individual con-
sumption. Both pure monopoly and entry-deterring monopoly are analyzed. The value function
W (q, θ, Q) is assumed to be linearly separable in intrinsic value and network value, and to take the
following form
W (q, θ,Q) = U(q, θ) + qw(Q).
4.1. Pure monopoly pricing
In the absence of an entry threat, the following proposition establishes the main characteristics of
the optimal fulfilled-expectations contracts:
Proposition 3. (a) If W (q, θ, Q) = U(q, θ) + qw(Q), then any optimal fulfilled-expectations con-
tract satisfies the following conditions:
U1(q∗(θ), θ) +w(Q∗)
U12(q∗(θ), θ)
=
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
, (4.1)
and
τ∗(θ) = U(q∗(θ), θ) + q∗(θ)w(Q∗)−
θZ
θ
U2(q
∗(x), x)dx, (4.2)
where Q∗ =
θR
θ
q∗(θ)f(θ)dθ.
(b) If w(Q)has a finite upper bound w, then an optimal fulfilled-expectations contract always
exists. In addition, if w1(Q) < −U11(q, θ) for all Q and q, then (4.1) and (4.2) specify the unique
optimal fulfilled-expectations contract.
(c)For all θ, q∗(θ) > q0(θ), and τ∗(θ) > τ0(θ).
Suﬃcient conditions for the existence of an optimal fulfilled-expectations equilibrium are fairly
mild — all that is required is that the marginal benefit from the network eﬀects w(Q) be bounded.
The condition for uniqueness requires that in general, marginal network value not grow too fast
relative to marginal intrinsic value. However, even if the solution is not unique, this is not unduly
troubling, since multiple possible equilibrium outcomes are not uncommon in models of network
goods. The monopolist simply needs to pick the optimal fulfilled-expectations contract that provides
the highest profits9. It is important to note that the results in part (c) of the proposition (and
those in Proposition 5) do not rely on uniqueness.
9Recall that customer expectations are formed after the contract is specified.
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Figure 4.1: Illustrates the optimal consumption of two types θ1 and θ2 (θ1 < θ2) with heterogeneous
network eﬀects under pure monopoly. The marginal value curves W1(q, θ,Q) are higher than the
corresponding U1(q, θ) curves, by a constant amount w (Q). This results in a strict increase in
consumption for all types, relative to the base case.
The network eﬀects shift the customer value functions up by qw(Q∗) for all types. Since this
shift is proportionate to individual consumption, it results in optimal quantities that are diﬀerent
from those of the base case. Part (c) of the proposition establishes that this is a strict increase
for all types, and is illustrated in Figure 4.1, for two candidate types. Correspondingly, prices also
go up for all customers. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 discuss the changes in the division of total surplus
further.
4.2. Entry deterring monopoly pricing
The analysis of Proposition 3 is now extended to the case where a threat of entry is successfully
deterred. Some new notation is introduced (though mostly in the proof of Proposition 4, which is
in the appendix).
Let qm(θ, Q) denote the Q-optimal contract under pure monopoly. Applying Lemma 2, this
allocation is defined for each θ by the necessary conditions
U1(qm(θ,Q), θ) +w(Q)
U12(qm(θ, Q), θ)
=
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
, (4.3)
and is unique for a fixed value of Q. Also, from Proposition 3, we know that there is an optimal
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fulfilled-expectations equilibrium — that is, there is a value of gross consumption such that
Qm =
θZ
θ
qm(θ, Qm)f(θ)dθ. (4.4)
The following proposition establishes that the monopolist’s pricing scheme results in individual
consumption that is either of the form qm(θ, Q), or that maximizes intrinsic value for the customer:
Proposition 4. Suppose W (q, θ,Q) = U(q, θ) + qw(Q). Assume that the uniqueness condition
w1(Q) < −U11(q, θ) from Proposition 3 is met. Define:
Qα = Q : qm(θ,Q) = α(θ), and (4.5)
θˆ(Q) = θ : qm(θ, Q) = α(θ). (4.6)
(a) If Qα ≤ Qm, then the unique optimal fulfilled-expectations contract is:
q∗(θ) = qm(θ,Qm) (4.7)
τ∗(θ) = U(qm(θ), θ) + qm(θ)w(Qm)− U(α(θ), θ)− [
θZ
θ
(U2(q
∗(x), x)− U2(α(x), x))dx] (4.8)
(b) If Qα > Qm, then the unique optimal fulfilled-expectations contract is:
q∗(θ) = α(θ) (4.9)
τ∗(θ) = α(θ)w(Q∗) (4.10)
for θ ≤ θˆ(Q∗), and
q∗(θ) = qm(θ, Q∗) (4.11)
τ∗(θ) = U(q∗(θ), θ) + q∗(θ)w(Q∗)− U(α(θ), θ)− [
θZ
θˆ(Q)
(U2(q
∗(x), x)− U2(α(x), x))dx](4.12)
for θ ≥ θˆ(Q∗), where Q∗ is the unique solution to:
Q =
θˆ(Q)Z
θ
α(θ)f(θ)dθ +
θZ
θˆ(Q)
qm(θ,Q)f(θ)dθ. (4.13)
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Proposition 4 establishes that the same conditions that ensure uniqueness of the optimal fulfilled-
expectations contract in the absence of an entry threat are suﬃcient to ensure uniqueness under the
threat of entry. It also establishes that the optimal fulfilled-expectations contract that deters entry
can be elegantly characterized using a combination of Q-optimal contracts under pure monopoly,
and the contract that implements allocations of α(θ) for each type θ.
If qm(θ,Qm) > α(θ) for the lowest type θ, an immediate corollary of the proposition is that
the presence of the entry threat does not change the individual consumption of any of the types
(since qm(θ, Qm) > α(θ) implies that Qα < Qm). This is likely to happen when the marginal
network value w(Q) is high relative to marginal intrinsic value, or equivalently, if network eﬀects
are substantial for all types,. This is illustrated further in section 4.4.
Under the conditions of part (b) of the proposition, there are substantial changes in individual
consumption (relative to pure monopoly). However, θˆ(Q∗) is always an interior point of [θ, θ]. This
implies that the larger increases in individual consumption (to the level α(θ) which maximizes
intrinsic value) will always be for a subset of ‘lower’ types, and that there will always be a subset
of higher types whose individual consumption is still of the form qm(θ,Q∗). It is easily shown
that under part (b) of the proposition, Q∗ > Qm, which implies that consumption increases for all
customer types (but more substantially for the lower subset).
4.3. Welfare analysis
This subsection characterizes how the monopolist and its customers share the surplus generated by
the network eﬀects under pure monopoly, and also discusses surplus division under entry-deterring
monopoly.
Suppose q∗(θ), τ∗(θ) is an optimal fulfilled-expectations contract for some value functionW (q, θ,Q),
with realized gross consumption Q∗ =
θR
θ
q∗(θ)f(θ)dθ. Relative to the base case, the net change in
total surplus as a consequence of the network eﬀects is therefore:
θZ
θ
[W (q∗(θ), θ,Q∗)]f(θ)dθ −
θZ
θ
U(q0(θ), θ)f(θ)dθ. (4.14)
The direct change in surplus from a customer of type θ as a consequence of the network eﬀects is
defined as:
sn(θ) =W (q0(θ), θ, Q0)− U(q0(θ), θ), (4.15)
where Q0 =
θR
θ
q0(θ)f(θ)dθ. Similarly, define the indirect change in surplus from a customer of
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type θ as a consequence of the network eﬀects as
sq(θ) =W (q∗(θ), θ, Q∗)−W (q0(θ), θ,Q0) (4.16)
sn(θ) measures the change in surplus as a consequence of having the increase in value from the
network eﬀects, without accounting for any of the changes in consumption. sq(θ) measures the
changes in surplus that arise indirectly as a consequence of the changes in consumption (both
individual and gross) that the network eﬀects induce. The total change in surplus across all types,
as specified in (4.14), can now be equivalently expressed as
θR
θ
[sn(θ) + sq(θ)]f(θ)dθ.
Proposition 5. Under pure monopoly, the monopolist always captures all of the direct increase
in surplus, and shares some of the indirect increase in surplus with the customers. That is:
θZ
θ
τ∗(θ)f(θ)dθ −
θZ
θ
τ0(θ)f(θ)dθ ≥
θZ
θ
sn(θ)f(θ)dθ, (4.17)
and
θZ
θ
τ∗(θ)f(θ)dθ −
θZ
θ
τ0(θ)f(θ)dθ <
θZ
θ
[sn(θ) + sq(θ)]f(θ)dθ, (4.18)
where sn(θ) and sq(θ) are as defined in (4.15) and (4.16).
While proved for heterogeneous network eﬀects, this result applies trivially to homogeneous net-
work eﬀects, since under Proposition 1, there is no indirect increase in surplus, and the monopolist
captures all the direct surplus increase. Proposition 5 establishes that with heterogeneous network
eﬀects, the monopolist continues to get all the direct increase in surplus from the network eﬀects,
and that any increase in customer surplus are driven by increases in consumption.
Under entry-deterring monopoly, the division of direct and indirect increases in surplus is less
relevant — all customers of type θ get surplus at least equal to U(α(θ), θ), which implies that they
capture all of the intrinsic value that they create. Moreover, the customer types whose optimal
consumption is of the form qm(θ,Q∗) (that is, all customers under part (a), and the higher subset
under part (b) of Proposition 4) capture a fraction of the network value that they create. Since
U(α(θ), θ) > U(q∗(θ), θ) for q∗(θ) > α(θ), the monopolist needs to give up network value to the
customer if they raise consumption beyond α(θ). The negative terms in square brackets at the end
of equations (4.8) and (4.12) represent the surplus type θ gets beyond U(α(θ), θ), which implies
that these customers are capturing a fraction over and above this reservation level.
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Base case
Optimal contract: q0(θ) = 2θ; τ0(θ) = 2θ − θ2
Pure monopoly
Q-optimal contract: q(θ,Q) = 2θ+wQ, τ (θ,Q) = 2θ− θ2 + wQ(2 +wQ)
2
Optimal fulfilled-expectations contract: q∗(θ) = 2θ +
w
1−w, τ
∗(θ) = 2θ − θ2 + w(2−w)
2(1−w)2
Surplus functions: s∗(θ) = θ(θ +
w
1−w ), sF (θ) =
6θ(θ(1−w) +w)
2 +w
Table 4.1: Optimal contracts and surplus in the example with heterogeneous network eﬀects, under
pure monopoly
4.4. Example
The example presented in Section 3.3 is extended to incorporate network eﬀects that depend on
individual consumption as well as on gross consumption. The value function is assumed to take
the following form:
W (q, θ, Q) = (θ + 1)q − 1
2
q2 +wqQ, (4.19)
and as before, customer types are assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. The
definitions of the surplus functions s∗(θ) and sF (θ) are in Section 3.3.
Since U11(q, θ) = −1, the uniqueness condition in Propositions 3 and 4 reduces to w < 1.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 summarizes the solutions for the optimal contracts and surplus functions under
this condition. As expected from Proposition 3, both quantities and prices increase under pure
monopoly, relative to the base case. Figure 4.2 (a) and (b) illustrate the optimal contract for two
diﬀerent values of marginal network value w. In addition, by substituting q∗(θ) into τ∗(θ), one can
obtain the explicit pricing function:
p(q) =
w2
4(1−w)2 +
2−w
2(1−w)q −
q2
4
. (4.20)
The optimal pricing function is therefore a nonlinear two-part tariﬀ, with a fixed component
that increases with the marginal network value w, and a strictly concave variable portion — again,
implying a quantity discount that is progressively increasing. Moreover, diﬀerentiating (4.20) with
respect to q indicates that p1(q) =
2−w
2(1−w) −
q
2 , which is strictly increasing in w for w < 1. As a
consequence, absolute prices at any level of consumption always increase with w.
As shown in Figure 4.2 (c), an increase in w increases customer surplus for all customer types.
What is particularly interesting is that as w increases, the relative distribution of surplus across
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Figure 4.2: Illustrates the optimal fulfilled-expectation contracts and corresponding customer sur-
plus and relative surplus for pure monopoly, in the example when network eﬀects are heterogeneous
across types. In each figure, the dotted curve represents the base case (when network value is zero).
customer types is less convex. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2 (d), and indicates that at higher
levels of network eﬀects, surplus is distributed more evenly across customers of diﬀerent types. This
is a socially favorable result, because it suggests higher distributional equity of the value created,
across customers who diﬀer in their usage levels.
Under entry-deterring monopoly, equating the expressions for Qα and Qm indicate that part
(a) of Proposition is applicable for w ≥ 12 , and part (b) applies for w ≤
1
2 . This confirms that the
entry threat induces changes in total surplus (via an induced change in optimal consumption) for
lower levels of network eﬀects, but not at higher levels.
As illustrated in Figure 4.3 (a), as w increases, optimal consumption is raised (relative to the
corresponding levels under pure monopoly) for an increasingly smaller fraction of customer types,
and when w ≥ 12 , consumption is unaltered for all types (though total prices reduce by a fixed
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Entry-deterring monopoly
Intermediate variables: Qα =
1
w
; Qm =
1
1−w ; θˆ(Q) = 1−wQ
When w ≥ 12
Optimal fulfilled-expectations contract: q∗(θ) = 2θ +
w
1−w, τ
∗(θ) =
1
2(1−w)2 − (1− θ)
2
Surplus functions: s∗(θ) = θ(θ +
w
1−w ) +
1
2
, sF (θ) =
3((2θ2+1)(1−w)+2θw)
5−2w
When w ≤ 12
Optimal fulfilled-expectations contract: θ ≤ θˆ(Q∗): q∗(θ) = θ + 1, τ∗(θ) = wQ∗(1 + θ)
θ ≥ θˆ(Q∗): q∗(θ) = 2θ +wQ∗, τ∗(θ) = 2wQ∗ − (1− θ)2
Surplus functions: θ ≤ θˆ(Q∗): s∗(θ) = (1 + θ)
2
2
, sF (θ) =
3(1 + θ)2
7 + (wQ∗)3
θ ≥ θˆ(Q∗): s∗(θ) = (1+θ)
2+(θ−(1−wQ∗))2
2 , sF (θ) =
3s∗(θ)
7+(wQ∗)3
Note: When w ≤ 12 , Q∗ =
1−
√
1−3w2
w2
and θˆ(Q∗) = w−1+
√
1−3w2
w
Table 4.2: Optimal contracts and surplus expressions in the example with heterogeneous network
eﬀects, under entry-deterring monopoly
amount across all types).
At fairly low values of w, total price may increase for a subset of lower types. This is because
the changes in consumption are substantial for these lower customer types, relative to the case of
pure monopoly. Average prices (per unit of consumption) always decrease with a threat of entry,
across all types. Clearly, customer surplus also increases, across all types.
Figure 4.3 (c) and (d) further highlight the socially desirable eﬀect of a threat of entry that
was noted in section 3.3 — the flattening of the relative distribution of surplus across types. This
accentuates the increased distributional equity from increasing network eﬀects that was illustrated
in Figure 4.2(d). The former eﬀect is more pronounced when network eﬀects are lower. This
is not surprising, since the latter eﬀect is more pronounced when network eﬀects are higher (and
as a consequence, there is already less inequity across customers to begin with). This result has
interesting policy implications, which are discussed further in Section 5.
5. Discussion
A number of new results relating to the pricing of network goods have been derived in Sections 3
and 4. This section discusses some of these results, examines some of the model’s assumptions, and
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Fi gure 4.3: Illustrates the optimal fulfilled - e x p ect at ion co ntr ac ts an d c or r es p on di ng re lat i ve cu s -
tomer surplus for entry-deterring monopoly, in the example when network eﬀects are heterogeneous.
In each figure, the dotted curves represent the corresponding values in the case of pure monopoly.
concludes with an outline of open questions raised by the analysis.
5.1. Discussion of results
Managers in technology industries with network eﬀects face especially diﬃcult pricing problems.
Their challenges include setting complex pricing schedules for variable quantity purchases, designing
optimal quantity discounts, taking into account heterogeneity in network value across diﬀerent
customers, and also incorporating the reality that entry threats and ‘comparables’ from potential
competitors play an important role in limiting the amount customers can be charged. Network
eﬀects pose an additional unique challenge, since there is the trade-oﬀ between designing prices
that increase value from higher gross consumption, and prices that enables the seller to capture as
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much of this value as possible.
This paper provide a set of theoretical results, based on a model which explicitly captures these
issues, and can therefore form a robust basis for designing pricing policy for products of this kind. In
addition, many empirical papers on network externalities (for instance, Gandal, 1995, Brynjolfsson
and Kemerer, 1996, Forman, 2001) have studied technology markets — databases, spreadsheets,
networking equipment — in which sellers with monopoly power routinely oﬀer nonlinear pricing
schedules, sell variable quantities to customers, and price to deter entry. The results of this paper
could form a stronger theory base for future empirical work which aims to estimate the extent and
implications of network eﬀects in such markets.
When network eﬀects do not vary across customers, Proposition 1 establishes that an increase
in network eﬀects induces no change in consumption, and that all surplus from the network eﬀects
is appropriated by the monopolist. A threat of entry changes pricing substantially — a fixed fee
is oﬀered to all customer types, and the outcome is socially optimal. While the specification of
network eﬀects in section 3 is simple, it would apply to industries in which the primary network
value stems from a common fixed-cost reduction — for instance, the cost of finding the appropriate
hosting infrastructure, or qualified technical support. These results also indicate that if competing
products are anything but perfectly compatible, any oligopoly outcome will be socially inferior to
the entry-deterring monopoly outcome. In other words, from a regulatory perspective, ensuring a
credible threat of entry is more socially eﬃcient than actually inducing entry.
When the value realized from network eﬀects varies with individual consumption, Proposition
3 establishes a strict increase in individual consumption across all customer types. In any model of
nonlinear pricing, there is always a trade-oﬀ between value creation and price discrimination, and
the consumption of lower customer types is limited by the monopolist’ desire to capture as much
surplus as possible. The issue of value creation is accentuated further when there are network eﬀects,
since increases in consumption from any subset of customer types increases the value created by all
customer types. The trade-oﬀ still exists, though, and while pricing is redesigned to induce usage
increases from both lower and higher customer types, the lower-usage customers still consume at a
socially ineﬃcient level. However, the relative distribution of surplus improves for lower customer
types, implying that the network eﬀects benefit lower-usage customers disproportionately, even
though the higher-usage customers contribute relatively more to their actual magnitude.
Furthermore, when network value depends on individual consumption as well as gross con-
sumption, the eﬀects of an entry threat are less pronounced that those established by Proposition
2. In fact, as shown in Proposition 4(a), the threat of entry may have no eﬀect on consumption or
surplus, and may merely result in a price change that redistributes surplus between the monopolist
25
and its customers. Note that this occurs even when entry is not blockaded. This outcome is most
likely when, relative to marginal intrinsic value, marginal network value is fairly high across all
customers, as illustrated further by the example in Section 4.4.
The examples studied in sections 3.3 and 4.4 highlight the eﬀect of network eﬀects and entry
deterrence on the relative distribution of surplus across participating customers. Regulatory agen-
cies often consider implementing policy that aﬀects not just total surplus, but the equity of surplus
distribution across customers. For instance, the attention received by the issue of the ‘digital di-
vide’ illustrates this potential objective clearly. Towards this end, this paper establishes that even
if creating a credible threat of entry does not increase total surplus, it will reduce the inequity in
surplus division across the diﬀerent customers who generate the surplus through their consumption.
In addition, there will always be accompanying transfer of surplus to all customers. While the
outcome never maximizes total surplus, it is still likely that it is more eﬃcient than an oligopoly
with incompatible products.
5.2. Discussion of assumptions
The sequence of events specified in section 2.3 assumes that all customers have identical expectations
of gross consumption. Under the assumption of rational participants, this is not restrictive —
everyone has access to all the information needed to compute the expected consumption, and once
the monopolist has specified prices, there is no residual uncertainty about demand. Clearly, in
equilibrium, all customers must have the same expectation (the correct one).
However, compared to standard models of nonlinear pricing, this paper places a higher compu-
tational burden on customers. Each customer has to know F (θ), compute the optimal consumption
(not just for themselves, but for all customer types), and them calculate the gross consumption. It
may be likely that customers of network goods cannot actually compute the true gross consumption
immediately, due to a lack of information, or due to bounds on information processing capability.
There may be a multi-period adjustment process, in which customers iteratively make a series of
guesses which converge to the fulfilled-expectations equilibrium outcome. Alternately, customers
may learn the distribution of types from the pricing schedule. Formalizing these notions remains
(early-stage) work in progress.
The assumption that W (q, θ, Q) has a finite maximum q for all θ and Q is non-standard.
However, given that marginal costs are zero in the model, it is necessary in order to get a bounded
solution. It is also a reflection of reality — that customers do stop using zero marginal price products
at a finite level, typically due to the presence of resource constraints, and substitute uses for shared
resources, as discussed in Section 2.1.
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In addition, slightly modified versions of all of the results in this paper continue to hold under
the assumption of unbounded value functions and positive convex costs. Consider, for instance,
a (standard) specification in which customer utility is W˜ (q, θ, Q), W˜1(q, θ,Q) > 0 for all q (and
W˜ (q, θ, Q) has the other curvature properties attributed to the customer value function in this
paper). In addition, suppose the provision of quantity q to each customer has a positive cost c(q),
where c1(q) > 0, c11(q) > 0. If one defined the total surplus function as:
W (q, θ,Q) = W˜ (q, θ,Q)− c(q),
then W (q, θ, Q) would have the same properties as it does in this model. More importantly, all
the expressions for q∗(θ) derived in the model would continue to be valid, and so would all the
expressions for τ∗(θ), if it is treated as the optimal markup rather than the optimal price. In other
words, the optimal contracts would be q∗(θ), (τ∗(θ)+ c(q∗(θ))), with the same expressions for q∗(θ)
and τ∗(θ) as derived in sections 3 and 4. Therefore, this paper’s results are also applicable for
technology products that display positive network eﬀects, but which have non-zero marginal costs
(networking equipment or handheld computers, for instance)
Some of the paper’s results have specified conditions on the marginal network value that are
necessary to guarantee uniqueness. However, none of the properties of the contracts derived in
Propositions 1 through 3 depend on uniqueness, and neither do the results of Proposition 5. If
there are multiple optimal fulfilled-expectations equilibria, all the monopolist needs to do is choose
the one with the highest profits. Proposition 4 relies on uniqueness, though a slightly modified
version holds if one assumes that the monopolist always chooses the highest-profit contract.
5.3. Concluding remarks
The value from network eﬀects in this model vary across types due to the customers’ varying
individual consumption needs. As formulated, the model does not yet admit diﬀering network
value across diﬀerent types at the same level of individual consumption. A model that incorporates
this is work-in-progress. Early results suggest that for suﬃciently heterogeneous marginal network
value, network eﬀects may harm low-usage customers. Related work-in-progress involves a setup
where network value is of the form wF (Q) + qwV (Q). A more general characterization might be
to model the network good as a multiproduct bundle, and characterize customers using a two-
dimensional type vector, drawing on Armstrong (1996) and Rochet and Chone (1998). Admitting
this extension is current work-in-progress.
Industries in which products display network eﬀects are often natural monopolies, especially
when competing products are incompatible and marginal costs are near-zero. Moreover, entry-
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deterrence appears to play a significant role in practice (as illustrated by the Microsoft antitrust
case). The analysis of entry-deterring monopoly is therefore likely to be very important for these
industries. In light of the results obtained in this paper, a natural (and open) question that arises
is how non-zero entry costs aﬀects outcomes. Clearly, monopoly profits will increase, and entry
deterrence will still be an optimal strategy — however, it is likely that profits will increase by less
than the entry cost.
Finally, the analysis of entry deterrence suggests the feasibility of solving a general model of
nonlinear pricing for competing network goods. If customers expect the competing products to have
diﬀerent levels of gross consumption, they would view them as vertically diﬀerentiated products, as
in Stole (1995), which would admit pricing other than the zero-markup contracts in Mandy (1992).
Similar issues have been analyzed in a model of coalition formation by Economides and Flyer
(1998). Price reductions that increase network eﬀects would become ‘quality’ investments, and
the issue of how competitive intensity is aﬀected by these investments becomes relevant, especially
since Section 4.2 suggests that in a general model, the equilibrium profits of the smaller network are
likely to be zero. Recent results from Rochet and Stole (2001) indicate the feasibility of modeling
mixed-strategy equilibria, and I hope to address some of these questions in the near future.
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A. Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2
Given a expectation of gross consumption Q, any Q-feasible contract qF (t,Q), τF (t,Q) satisfies
[IC] if:
θ = arg max
t∈[θ,θ]
W (qF (t, Q), θ, Q)− τF (t,Q), (A.1)
for all θ. The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for (A.1) are:
[W1(q
F (θ,Q), θ,Q)]qF1 (θ,Q)− τF1 (θ,Q) = 0 ∀θ; (A.2)
[W11(q
F (θ,Q), θ,Q)](qF1 (θ,Q))
2 + [W1(q
F (θ, Q), θ,Q)]qF11(θ, Q)− τF11(θ,Q) ≤ 0 ∀θ. (A.3)
Diﬀerentiating (A.2) with respect to θ and substituting (A.3) yields modified suﬃcient conditions:
[W12(q
F (θ, Q), θ,Q)]qF1 (θ, Q) ≥ 0 ∀θ. (A.4)
By assumption, W12(q, θ, Q) is strictly positive, which means that (A.2) and (A.4) reduce to:
τF1 (θ, Q) = [W1(q
F (θ,Q), θ,Q)]qF1 (θ,Q), (A.5)
qF1 (θ, Q) ≥ 0, (A.6)
for all θ.
Now, under the contract qF (t,Q), τF (t,Q), the surplus of type θ is
s(θ) =W (qF (θ, Q), θ,Q)− τF (θ, Q). (A.7)
Diﬀerentiating (A.7) with respect to θ, and substituting (A.5) yields:
s1(θ) =W2(q
F (θ, Q), θ,Q). (A.8)
Since reservation utility Uˆ(θ) = 0 for all types, if IR is satisfied for the lowest type θ, it is satisfied
for all others. Therefore, s(θ) = 0, and
s(θ) =
θZ
x=θ
W2(q
F (x,Q), x,Q)dx. (A.9)
30
Combining (A.7), and (A.9), the objective function whose maximizer is the optimal contract
q(θ, Q), τ(θ,Q) can be written as:
θZ
θ=θ
[W (qF (θ, Q), θ,Q)− {
θZ
x=θ
W2(q
F (x,Q), x,Q)dx}]f(θ)dθ. (A.10)
Integrating the second part of (A.10) by parts and rearranging yields:
q(θ,Q) = arg max
qF (θ,Q)
θZ
θ=θ
[W (qF (θ, Q), θ, Q)−W2(qF (θ,Q), θ,Q)
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
]f(θ)dθ, (A.11)
subject to q(θ,Q) ≥ 0, and that
τ(θ, Q) =W (q(θ,Q), θ,Q)−
θZ
x=θ
W2(q(x,Q), x,Q)dx. (A.12)
If the unconstrained problem has a unique solution for which q(θ,Q) ≥ 0, then this is the solution
to the constrained problem as well.
Define
H(θ) =
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
(A.13)
First-order conditions for the unconstrained problem are therefore:
W1(q(θ, Q), θ, Q) = [W12(q(θ,Q), θ,Q)]H(θ) ∀θ, (A.14)
and are suﬃcient if the point-wise profit function:
π(q, θ,Q) =W (q, θ,Q)− [W2(q, θ, Q)]H(θ) (A.15)
is strictly concave in q. Diﬀerentiating (A.15) with respect to q twice yields:
π11(q, θ, Q) =W11(q, θ,Q)− [W112(q, θ, Q)]H(θ), (A.16)
which verifies that π(q, θ,Q) is strictly concave, since W11 < 0, and W112 ≥ 0. This ensures
that for the unconstrained problem, first-order conditions (A.14) yield the unique solution. These
conditions can be rearranged as:
W1(q(θ, Q), θ, Q)
W12(q(θ,Q), θ,Q)
=
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
. (A.17)
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Now, diﬀerentiating both sides of (A.14) with respect to θ yields:
[W11(q(θ,Q), θ,Q)]q1(θ, Q) + [W12(q(θ,Q), θ,Q)] =
[W112(q(θ, Q), θ,Q)]H(θ)q1(θ,Q) + [W122(q(θ,Q), θ,Q)]H(θ) + [W12(q(θ, Q), θ, Q)]H1(θ)
which implies that:
q1(θ,Q) =
[W12(q(θ, Q), θ,Q)][1−H1(θ)]− [W122(q(θ, Q), θ,Q)]H(θ)
[W112(q(θ,Q), θ, Q)]H(θ)−W11(q(θ, Q), θ,Q)
. (A.18)
Since π(q, θ,Q) has been shown to be strictly concave in q, the denominator of (A.18) is strictly
positive. Also, the reciprocal of the hazard rate is non-increasing in θ, which implies that H1(θ) ≤
0. Therefore, so long as W122(q, θ) is non-positive, the numerator of (A.18) is strictly positive.
Consequently, it has been established that
q1(θ,Q) > 0, (A.19)
which implies that the unique unconstrained solution q(θ, Q) always satisfies the constraint, and
completes the proof.
Before proceeding further, a couple of definitions and intermediate results are needed:
Definition 1. A feasible fulfilled-expectations contract is a menu of price-quantity pairs qFE(θ), τFE(θ)
such that the contract qF (t,Q), τF (t, Q) defined by
Q =
θZ
θ
qFE(θ)f(θ)dθ
qF (t, Q) = qFE(t)
τF (t, Q) = τFE(t)
is a Q-feasible contract.
Note that if any Q-feasible contract qF (t,Q), τF (t,Q) satisfies fulfilled-expectations at some Q:
Q =
θZ
θ
qF (t, Q)f(t)dt, (A.20)
then the contract qFE(θ) = qF (θ,Q), τFE(θ) = τF (θ, Q) is a feasible fulfilled-expectations contract.
32
Definition 2. The gross consumption function is defined as:
Γ(Q) =
θZ
θ
q(θ,Q)f(θ)dθ, (A.21)
where q(θ, Q) is part of the unique Q-optimal contract associated with an expected gross consump-
tion Q.
Two immediate consequences of this definition are:
Lemma 3. (a) For any Q-optimal contract q(θ,Q), τ(θ,Q), if Γ(Q) = Q, then the contract defined
by
q∗(θ) = q(θ, Q); (A.22)
τ∗(θ) = τ(θ, Q) (A.23)
is an optimal fulfilled-expectations contract.
(b) Γ(0) > 0.
Proof. Part (a) follows directly from the definition of Γ(Q) and of an optimal fulfilled-
expectations contract, and part (b) from the fact that U(q, θ) > 0 for q > 0.
The next lemma, which establishes the strict monotonicity of U1(q,θ)U12(q,θ) , follows from decreasing
absolute risk aversion:
Lemma 4. If ddθ (
−U11(q,θ)
U1(q,θ)
) < 0, then ddq (
U1(q,θ)
U12(q,θ)
) < 0.
Proof.
d
dθ
(
−U11(q, θ)
U1(q, θ)
) =
−U112(q, θ)U1(q, θ) + U11(q, θ)U12(q, θ)
(U1(q, θ))2
, (A.24)
and
d
dq
(
U1(q, θ)
U12(q, θ)
) =
U11(q, θ)U12(q, θ)− U112(q, θ)U1(q, θ)
(U12(q, θ))2
. (A.25)
The denominators of the RHS (A.24) and (A.25) are both strictly positive, and the numerators are
identical. The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose q∗(θ), τ∗(θ) is an optimal fulfilled-expectations contract. From the definition of an
optimal fulfilled-expectations contract, the contract defined by:
Q∗ =
θZ
θ
q∗(θ)f(θ)dθ (A.26a)
q(θ, Q∗) = q∗(θ) (A.26b)
τ(θ, Q∗) = τ∗(θ) (A.26c)
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must be a Q-optimal contract. Since w(Q) does not depend directly on θ or q, from Lemma 2,
q∗(θ,Q∗), τ∗(θ, Q∗) must satisfy:
U1(q∗(θ), θ, Q∗)
U12(q∗(θ), θ)
=
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
, (A.27)
and
τ∗(θ,Q) = U(q∗(θ), θ) +w(Q∗)−
θZ
x=θ
U2(q
∗(x), x)dx (A.28)
It follows from (A.26b), (A.26c), (A.27) and (A.28) that q∗(θ), τ∗(θ) satisfies:
U1(q
∗(θ), θ)
U12(q∗(θ), θ)
=
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
, (A.29)
and
τ∗(θ) = U(q∗(θ), θ) +w(Q∗)−
θZ
x=θ
[U2(q
∗(x), x)]dx. (A.30)
Comparing (A.29) with (2.13) yields
q∗(θ) = q0(θ), (A.31)
since Lemma 4 has established that U1(q,θ)U12(q,θ) is strictly monotonic in q. Therefore, Q
∗ = Q0.
Consequently, comparing (A.30) with (2.14) yields:
τ∗(θ) = τ0(θ) +w(Q0). (A.32)
Now, from Lemma 2, it is clear that
q(θ,Q) = q0(θ) (A.33)
for all Q and θ. Therefore, Γ(Q) = Q0 for all Q. Clearly, Γ(Q) always has a unique fixed point Q0,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider any expectation of gross consumptionQ, and anyQ-feasible contract qF (θ,Q), τF (θ,Q).
[IR] implies that:
U(qF (θ,Q), θ) +w(Q)− τF (θ,Q) ≥ U(α(θ), θ). (A.34)
Since U(qF (θ,Q), θ) ≤ U(α(θ), θ), this implies that
τF (θ, Q) ≤ w(Q) (A.35)
for all θ. Consequently, a pricing scheme that provides the monopolist with a total price of w(Q)
from each type has equal or higher profits than any Q-feasible contract. Now, if payments from
each type are constant across types, incentive-compatibility requires that a customer of type θ be
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allocated α(θ). Since marginal costs are zero, this means that
q(θ,Q) = α(θ); (A.36)
τ(θ,Q) = w(Q) (A.37)
is Q-optimal. Defining
Q∗ =
θZ
θ
α(θ)f(θ)dθ, (A.38)
this implies that Γ(Q) = Q∗ for all Q, which in turn implies that there is a unique optimal fulfilled-
expectations contract, and the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3
(a) Suppose q∗(θ), τ∗(θ) is an optimal fulfilled-expectations contract. By definition, the contract
defined by:
Q∗ =
θZ
θ
q∗(θ)f(θ)dθ (A.39a)
q(θ, Q∗) = q∗(θ) (A.39b)
τ(θ, Q∗) = τ∗(θ) (A.39c)
must be a Q-optimal contract. Applying Lemma 2 for W (q, θ,Q) = U(q, θ) + qw(Q) yields:
U1(q
∗(θ), θ,Q∗) +w(Q∗)
U12(q∗(θ), θ)
=
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
, (A.40)
and
τ∗(θ, Q) = U(q∗(θ), θ) + q∗(θ)w(Q∗)−
θZ
x=θ
U2(q
∗(x), x)dx (A.41)
Consequently, q∗(θ), τ(θ) satisfies:
U1(q∗(θ), θ) +w(Q∗)
U12(q∗(θ), θ)
=
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
, (A.42)
and
τ∗(θ) = U(q∗(θ), θ) +w(Q∗)−
θZ
x=θ
[U2(q
∗(x), x)]dx. (A.43)
(b) From Lemma 2, for any Q, individual consumption in the unique Q-optimal contract satis-
fies:
U1(q(θ, Q), θ) +w(Q)
U12(q(θ,Q), θ)
=
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
(A.44)
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Existence: If w(Q) is bounded, this implies that W1(q(θ,Q), θ, Q) is bounded for all θ, which
in turn implies that q(θ,Q) is bounded for all θ, since U11(q, θ) < 0. Therefore Γ(Q) is bounded.
Since Γ(0) > 0 (from Lemma 3), this implies that a fixed point for Γ(Q) exists.
Uniqueness: Diﬀerentiating both sides of (A.44) with respect to Q and rearranging yields:
q2(θ,Q) =
w1(Q)
U112(q(θ, Q), θ)
1−F (θ)
f(θ) −U11(q(θ,Q), θ)
. (A.45)
Since U112(q(θ, Q), θ) ≥ 0, this implies that
q2(θ, Q) ≤
w1(Q)
−U11(q(θ, Q), θ)
. (A.46)
From the conditions of the proposition for uniqueness, we know that w1(Q) < −U11(q, θ), which
when combined with (A.46) implies that
q2(θ, Q) < 1 (A.47)
Now, diﬀerentiating both sides of (A.21) with respect to Q yields
Γ1(Q) =
θZ
θ
q2(θ,Q)f(θ)dθ, (A.48)
which when combined with (A.47), implies that Γ1(Q) < 1 for all Q. This in turn implies that
Γ(Q) is a contraction, and since Γ(0) > 0 from Lemma 3, it has a unique and strictly positive fixed
point.
(c) When w(Q) > 0, (4.1) implies that
U1(q
∗(θ), θ)
U12(q∗(θ), θ)
<
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
(A.49)
From Lemma 1, we know that
U1(q
0(θ), θ)
U12(q0(θ), θ)
=
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
(A.50)
and therefore
U1(q
0(θ), θ)
U12(q0(θ), θ)
>
U1(q
∗(θ), θ)
U12(q∗(θ), θ)
(A.51)
From Lemma 4, we know that U1(q,θ)U12(q,θ) is strictly decreasing in q for all θ, which when combined
with (A.51) proves that q0(θ) < q∗(θ) for all θ.
Proof of Proposition 4
This proof uses three intermediate results (Lemmas 5, 6 and 7) which are stated and proved in
the body of the proof. Some new notation is also introduced, which follows Jullien (2000), since
Proposition 3 of that paper is used to establish Lemma 7.
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For any expectation of gross consumption Q, define:
l(γ, θ, Q) = argmax
q
U(q, θ) + qw(Q)− U2(q, θ)
γ − F (θ)
f(θ)
. (A.52)
It follows immediately that
l(1, θ, Q) = qm(θ, Q), (A.53)
and that l(0, θ,Q) ≥ β(θ,Q) for all θ, which implies that l(0, θ,Q) > α(θ) for all θ.
Next, the unique incentive-compatible contract that implements Uˆ(θ) — that is, the unique
contract under which the surplus of type θ is Uˆ(θ) — can be shown to be:
qˆ(θ) = α(θ); (A.54)
τˆ(θ) = α(θ)w(Q). (A.55)
Therefore, the set Θ = {θ : l(1, θ,Q) ≤ qˆ(θ) ≤ l(0, θ,Q)} reduces to:
Θ = {θ : qm(θ,Q) ≤ α(θ)}. (A.56)
Also, define
γˆ(θ,Q) = γ : qˆ(θ) = argmax
q
U(q, θ) + qw(Q)− U2(q, θ)
γ − F (θ)
f(θ)
(A.57)
Since qˆ(θ) = α(θ), and U1(α(θ), θ) = 0, first-order conditions for (A.57) yield:
γˆ(θ, Q) = F (θ) +
f(θ)w(Q)
U12(α(θ), θ)
(A.58)
Finally, define:
H(γ, θ) =
γ − F (θ)
f(θ)
The following intermediate results can now be stated and proved.
Lemma 5. If 1−F (θ)f(θ) is non-increasing for all θ, then H2(γ, θ) ≤ 0 for all θ, γ such that H(γ, θ) ≥ 0.
Proof. Assume the converse — that for some γ, γ−F (θ)f(θ) is increasing in some interval [θ1, θ2].
This implies that
γ − F (θ1)
f(θ1)
<
γ − F (θ2)
f(θ2)
. (A.59)
Since F (θ1) < F (θ2), this implies that f(θ1) > f(θ2), which in turn implies that
1− γ
f(θ1)
<
1− γ
f(θ2)
(A.60)
Adding (A.59) and (A.60) yields 1−F (θ1)f(θ1) <
1−F (θ2)
f(θ2)
, which contradicts the fact that 1−F (θ)f(θ) is
non-increasing, and the result follows.
Lemma 6. If ∂
∂θ
(U11(α(θ),θ)U12(α(θ),θ)) ≤ 0, then l2(γˆ(θ,Q), θ, Q) ≤ qˆ1(θ)
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Proof. By the definition of γˆ(θ,Q) in (A.57), and of l(γ, θ,Q) in (A.52), we know that
l(γˆ(θ, Q), θ, Q) = qˆ(θ) = α(θ). (A.61)
From the first order conditions for (A.52), we know that
U1(l(γ, θ,Q), θ) +w(Q) = U12(l(γ, θ,Q), θ)
γ − F (θ)
f(θ)
. (A.62)
Diﬀerentiating both sides of (A.62) with respect to θ and rearranging yields:
l2(γ, θ,Q) =
U12(l(γ, θ,Q), θ)(1−H2(γ, θ))− U122(l(γ, θ,Q), θ)H(γ, θ)
U112(l(γ, θ, Q), θ)H(γ, θ)− U11(l(γ, θ,Q), θ)
. (A.63)
Substituting in γˆ(θ, Q) and using (A.61) yields:
l2(γˆ(θ, Q), θ,Q) =
U12(α(θ), θ)(1−H2(γˆ(θ,Q), θ))− U122(α(θ),Q), θ)H(γˆ(θ, Q), θ)
U112(α(θ), θ)H(γˆ(θ, Q), θ)− U11(α(θ), θ)
. (A.64)
Since qˆ(θ) = α(θ), and U1(α(θ), θ) = 0 by definition, it follows that:
qˆ1(θ) =
U12(α(θ), θ)
−U11(α(θ), θ)
. (A.65)
Comparing equations (A.64) and (A.65), and using the fact that U11(q, θ)U12(q, θ)H2(γ, θ) ≥ 0, it
follows that l2(γˆ(θ,Q), θ, Q) ≤ qˆ1(θ) if:
U12((α(θ), θ))U112(α(θ), θ)− U11(α(θ), θ)U122(α(θ), θ) ≤ 0, (A.66)
which is precisely the condition implied by ∂
∂θ
(U11(q,θ)U12(q,θ)) ≤ 0. The result follows.
It was shown in Section 2.5 that the problem of finding an optimal contract which deters entry
was equivalent to finding an optimal contract with type-dependent participation constraints. The
following result therefore holds, based on Jullien (2000):
Lemma 7. The Q-optimal contract which deters entry satisfies:
(a) If θ ∈ Θ,
q(θ, Q) = α(θ); (A.67)
τ(θ) = α(θ)w(Q).
(b) If θ /∈ Θ, then:
q(θ, Q) = qm(θ,Q); (A.68)
τ(θ) = U(qm(θ,Q), θ) + qm(θ,Q)w(Q)− U(α(θ), θ)− [
θZ
θˆ(Q)
(U2(q
m(x,Q), x)− U2(α(x), x))dx],
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where Θ = {θ : qm(θ, Q) ≤ α(θ)}, and θˆ(Q) = θ : qm(θ, Q) = α(θ).
In addition, if Θ is empty, then for all θ:
q(θ, Q) = qm(θ,Q), (A.69)
τ(θ) = U(qm(θ, Q), θ) + qm(θ,Q)w(Q)− U(α(θ), θ)− [
θZ
θ
(U2(q
m(x,Q), x)− U2(α(x), x))dx].
Proof. Lemma 6 ensures that the problem of finding a Q-optimal contract satisfies all the con-
ditions for Proposition 3 of Jullien (2000) to apply. The expressions for q(θ,Q) follow immediately.
The expressions for τ(θ,Q) follow by imposing incentive-compatibility and profit maximization by
the monopolist.
Now, recall the definitions of Qm,Qα from the statement of Proposition 4, and Γ(Q) from
Definition 2:
Qm = Q : Q =
θZ
θ
qm(θ,Q)f(θ)dθ (A.70)
Qα = Q : qm(θ,Q) = α(θ), (A.71)
Γ(Q) =
θZ
θ
qm(θ,Q)f(θ)dθ (A.72)
Clearly, Qm is a fixed point of Γ(Q). Also define Γˆ(Q) as
Γˆ(Q) =
θˆ(Q)Z
θ
α(θ)f(θ)dθ +
θZ
θˆ(Q)
qm(θ,Q)f(θ)dθ, if θˆ(Q) exists; (A.73)
Γˆ(Q) = Γ(Q) otherwise. (A.74)
Now, from (A.45). we know that
qm2 (θ, Q) =
w1(Q)
U112(qm(θ,Q), θ)
1−F (θ)
f(θ) − U11(qm(θ,Q), θ)
. (A.75)
The RHS of (A.75) is strictly positive since w1(Q) > 0, U112(q, θ) ≥ 0, and U11(q, θ) < 0. Therefore,
qm2 (θ,Q) > 0 for all Q. As a consequence, if Q
α < Qm, then qm(θ, Qα) < qm(θ, Qm), which in turn
implies that qm(θ,Qm) > α(θ). The set Θ is therefore empty, and this establishes part (a), based
on Lemma 7.
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Now, diﬀerentiating both sides of (A.73) and (A.74) with respect to Q yields:
Γˆ1(Q) =
θZ
θˆ(Q)
qm1 (θ, Q)f(θ)dθ, if θˆ(Q) exists; (A.76)
Γˆ1(Q) = Γ1(Q) otherwise. (A.77)
Since qm2 (θ,Q) > 0, this implies that Γˆ1(Q) ≤ Γ1(Q), and the inequality is strict if θˆ(Q) > θ.
Consequently, under the conditions for uniqueness in Proposition 3, both Γ(Q) and Γˆ(Q) have
unique strictly positive fixed points.
If Q ≥ Qα, Γˆ(Q) = Γ(Q). As a consequence, if Qα > Qm, this means that the fixed point of
Γˆ(Q) has to lie in (Qm,Qα), because we know that Γˆ(Q) > Γ(Q) for Q < Qα, which means it
cannot have a fixed point at Qm, which in turn implies that if it has a fixed point greater than Qα,
this violates the uniqueness of the fixed point of Γ(Q) that was established in Proposition 3.
Using the fact that the unique optimal fulfilled-expectation equilibrium has gross consumption
that is the fixed point of Γˆ(Q), part (b) of the result follows. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the contract:
qFE(θ) = q0(θ) (A.78a)
τFE(θ) = τ0(θ) + q0(θ)w(Q0) (A.78b)
It is straightforward to establish that this is a feasible fulfilled-expectations contract. Under this
contract, the monopolist’s profits would be
Π =
θZ
θ
τ0(θ)f(θ)dθ +
θZ
θ
q0(θ)w(Q0)f(θ)dθ (A.79)
Using the definition of sn(θ) from (4.15), this implies that
Π =
θZ
θ
τ0(θ)f(θ)dθ +
θZ
θ
sn(θ)f(θ)dθ (A.80)
Profits under the optimal fulfilled expectations contract must be at least as high as Π. Based on
(A.80), this yields:
θZ
θ
τ∗(θ)f(θ)dθ ≥
θZ
θ
τ0(θ)f(θ)dθ +
θZ
θ
sn(θ)f(θ)dθ,
which proves the first part. Now denote the surplus of type θ under the optimal fulfilled-expectations
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contract as s∗(θ), and the surplus of type θ under the base case contract as s0(θ). We know that
s∗(θ) =
θZ
x=θ
[U2(q
∗(x), x)]dx,
and
s0(θ) =
θZ
x=θ
[U2(q
0(x), x)]dx.
Since q∗(θ) > q0(θ), and U12(q, θ) > 0, this implies that s∗(θ) > s0(θ) for all θ. Therefore, the
monopolist does not appropriate all the surplus generated by the network eﬀects, and the second
part of the result follows.
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